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ABSTRACT
Nietzsche is a popular source of inspiration for transhumanist writers. Some, such as
Sorgner (2009) and More (2010), argue that Nietzsche ought to be considered a precursor of the
movement. Transhumanism is a philosophy committed to the desirability of using technology to
transform human beings, through significant alteration of their brains and bodies, into a new
posthuman species. One of the defining characteristics of transhumanism is the desire for
personal immortality. I argue that this feature of transhumanism is wholly incompatible with
Nietzsche’s philosophy, and a close examination of this disagreement brings out the degree to
which transhumanists and Nietzsche differ in their values and philosophical commitments.
Nietzsche does not think that personal immortality is desirable or metaphysically possible. I
show that his views have more in common with philosophers like Bernard Williams and Derek
Parfit than they do with transhumanism.
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INTRODUCTION

There’s nothing inherently wrong with conjuring up an historical ghost to speak for you.
All of us are familiar with the experience of having a good idea only to find that same idea
already expressed—and probably more eloquently—by some long dead philosopher.
Summoning this famous figure as an expert witness can be a powerful rhetorical tool, even if
some anachronistic distortions are required to match their views to your own. All too often,
however, we squeeze the life out of these historical figures—they’re reduced to little more than a
name, a mustache, a short list of famous terms and ideas. In the process, we lose sight of our
influencer’s most interesting thoughts.
So, you have the phenomenon of Friedrich Nietzsche’s quotes and ideas appearing
dramatically out of context in the works of philosophers who in one way or another are
supporting positions closer to those that Nietzsche argued against. Undoubtedly, Nietzsche
himself, with his penchant for elusive language, irony, and prosopopoeia, bears some of the
responsibility for this confusion, but the sheer variety of groups that have misinterpreted him
since his death is as impressive as it is baffling. There have been Nietzschean existentialists,
Nietzschean postmodernists, and Nietzschean fascists. More recently, there have been
Nietzschean transhumanists.
Transhumanism is, roughly, a philosophy advocating the use of technology to
dramatically alter the human body and nature into a new, posthuman form. Nietzsche is a
popular source of inspiration for transhumanist writers, and some go so far as to argue that
Nietzsche ought to be considered an “ancestor” or kindred spirit of the movement (Sorgner 2009;
More 2010). Superficially, these claims seem compelling. Nevertheless, transhumanists who see
much of themselves in Nietzsche are mistaken. In fact, Nietzsche’s thinking poses serious
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challenges to the transhumanist worldview that transhumanists writers ought to take more
seriously.
I focus here on the topic of personal immortality—a favorite of transhumanists and a
point at which the differences between them and Nietzsche are clear. Transhumanists seek to
radically extend their lifespan, indefinitely if possible. Yet, it can be quite convincingly
demonstrated that Nietzsche does not think that personal immortality is either desirable or
metaphysically possible. A close examination of Nietzsche’s criticisms of immortality brings out
the degree to which transhumanists and Nietzsche differ in their values and philosophical
commitments.
Of course, transhumanists are not the only people concerned with personal immortality.
Fear, uncertainty, and confusion in the face of death are feelings we are all familiar with. The
transhumanist approach to death is not so different from those of some traditional religions—
new chrome and neon furnishings for old monasteries. A Nietzschean response to
transhumanism then, may be of interest to a wide variety of people, whether or not they find the
technological optimism of transhumanism all that plausible. In other words, examining what
Nietzsche has to say about death allows us to focus on some oft overlooked features his
philosophy that suggest to us a more radical way of viewing our own inevitable deaths and our
usual desire for immortality.
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2

WHAT’S IT LIKE TO BE A POSTHUMAN?

What does it mean to be a transhumanist? Descriptions of the movement, even those
given by its founding figures, are often so vague and inclusive that they fail to capture what
makes transhumanism either novel or controversial.1 Compounding this problem is the existence
of a (much larger) group of people—cyberpunk enthusiasts, cyberfeminists, hyperpop fans, and
so on whose interests are aesthetic, metaphorical, or social but who make use of the same
trappings and concepts of transhumanism in order to explore what it means to be human, the
relationship between the person and the body, the effects of technology on our lives, and so on.
What separates transhumanists from those who merely have an interest in the philosophical
questions posed by technology is a normative commitment to the desirability of quite literally
altering—or “enhancing”—human beings and human experience through the significantly
transformative use of new or speculative technologies. The basic idea is that the technology of
the future—genetic engineering, brain-machine interfaces, virtual reality, and advanced artificial
intelligence are common topics of discussion—may provide us with the means of transcending
the current biological limitations of the human organism and open up to us new and more
desirable modes of existence.2 Very often, this transformation is phrased in pseudo-Darwinian

Nick Bostrom, for instance, writes, “[Transhumanism] promotes an interdisciplinary approach to
understanding and evaluating the opportunities for enhancing the human condition and the human
organism opened up by the advancement of technology” (Bostrom 2005a).
2
I should be clearer about what I mean by significantly transformative. Clearly, technology has already
transformed the way that humans live their lives, and it will continue to do so. Many of the technologies
that interest transhumanists have their uncontroversial uses. Genetic engineering, for example, may be
used to treat a large variety of diseases. Such therapeutic uses of new technology are generally
uncontroversial to all but the most extreme Luddites. At the same time, there are many instances in which
the use of new technology for “enhancement” or cosmetic purposes might be equally uncontroversial.
Take, for a concrete example, transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), in which electrodes
are applied to the scalp to stimulate the brain with a weak electrical current. When applied, tDCS
modulates brain activity, and it’s therapeutically effective in treating some psychiatric disorders (Philip et
al. 2017). Yet, there is also evidence that tDCS can temporarily improve memory and attention in
neurologically healthy people, raising ethical and practical questions about its application (Coffman et al.
2014). On the one hand, tDCS might be used by some to gain an unfair advantage in competition, similar
1
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terms, such as when Max More, one of the movement’s early proponents, describes
transhumanism as:
Philosophies of life… that seek the continuation and acceleration of the evolution
of intelligent life beyond its currently human form and human limitations by
means of science and technology, guided by life-promoting principles and values.
(More 1990)
Similarly, Nick Bostrom, transhumanism’s most notable representative in academic
philosophy, writes that human nature ought to be seen as a work-in-progress—one that may soon
be under human control (Bostrom 2005a). Natural selection, of course, isn’t an agent that works
on anything—the concept refers to a mindless, directionless filtering process—but the idea here
is that humans may, through technological ingenuity, gain control of the tools of design and their
own future development.3 In this way transhumanism resembles a sort of futurist’s existentialism
in which we might be free to redesign the species as we see fit. As the technological capability of
the species increases, the biological flaws and limitations of the human organism that serve as a
barrier to greater advances in knowledge, happiness, beauty—whichever ancient white whale

to the use of performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) in sports. And like PEDs, long term use of tDCS might
have deleterious health or cognitive effects (Jwa 2015). On the other hand, there are certain instances
where someone having enhanced attention may be desirable—in the cases of surgeons and pilots and so
on. One might suspect, given the mention of “brain modulation” that tDCS might be considered a
“transhuman” technology. But while the use of tDCS by neurotypical people to improve attention would
certainly count as an “enhancement” use of technology, you do not need to be a transhumanist to accept
that there are conditions for which this nontherapeutic use might be ethical or desirable. Almost all of us
accept the use of “enhancement” technologies to some degree—things as widespread as caffeine
consumption would fall under this category. Yet the level of modification and “enhancement” provided
by extant technology is far milder than the radical change the transhumanist project calls for. A person
who uses tDCS, much like a person who drinks caffeine, retains their human character—transhumanists
are interested in using technology to go beyond what any neurotypical human could now experience or
even imagine.
3
The use of teleological language is a recurring problem in the transhumanist literature. Species do not
improve or become more evolved, populations merely change in response to environmental pressures and
challenges, drift, and so on. Of course, most transhumanists do not claim that natural selection is actually
teleological, and the problem of persistent teleology isn’t unique to transhumanists—you can find many
biologists and philosophers of all types slipping up. Nevertheless, the remnants and distortions of this
thinking are often utilized for rhetorical effect in transhumanist writings.
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floating in the Aegean Sea you find most enticing—or perhaps just plain pleasure, might no
longer frustrate us. As such, transhumanist writers often assume, either implicitly or explicitly, a
moral imperative—the human species ought to be improved upon.
Perhaps these sentiments of transhumanism are most perfectly expressed in Max More’s
mawkish “A Letter to Mother Nature” (2013), where the author addresses the above-mentioned
mindless, directionless filtering process and writes, “we must say that you have in many ways
done a poor job with the human constitution. You compel us to age and die… You were miserly
in the extent to which you gave us awareness of our somatic, cognitive, and emotional processes.
You held out the sharpest senses for other animals. You made us functional only under narrow
environmental conditions. You gave us limited memory, poor impulse control, and tribalistic,
xenophobic urges. And you forgot to give us the operating manual for ourselves!” (p. 449)
What’s more, Mother Nature has “lost interest in our further evolution.” Transhumanists,
however, will not accept this state of half-assembly, and More lists seven “amendments” to the
human constitution, such as, “We will supplement the neocortex with a ‘metabrain’,” and, “We
will no longer be slaves to our genes,” and, “We will no longer tolerate the tyranny of aging and
death” (p. 450).
Through technological transformation, transhumanists hope to bring about a new
posthuman species—one with physical and cognitive capacities greatly exceeding those of
humans. Exact clarity on what the posthuman life will be like is difficult to come by and varies
depending on the author’s preferences and depth of technical knowledge—though all authors
agree they will live longer and more fulfilling lives than humans. As Bostrom writes, “If, aside
from extended healthspans, the essence of posthumanity is to be able to have thoughts and
experiences that we cannot readily think or experience with our current capacities, then it is not
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surprising that our ability to imagine what posthuman life might be like is very limited”
(Bostrom 2008, p. 32). Posthumans may view us humans in the same distant way that we view
gorillas and chimps—or bats, lizards, and bees, for that matter. One is transhuman insofar as one
is part of the transition from humanity to the more desirable state of posthumanity (even if, given
current technological limitations, one is transhuman mostly in spirit and mindset).
Transhumanists either wish to become posthumans themselves or else set the stage for future
posthumans.
While prominent transhumanists like Max More have been claiming Nietzsche as an
influence for decades (More 1990; 2010), the contemporary debate about Nietzsche’s connection
to the movement took off with Stefan Sorgner’s essay, “Nietzsche, the Overhuman, and
Transhumanism” (2009). There, Sorgner argues that there are significant and fundamental
similarities between the concept of a posthuman and Nietzsche’s Übermensch (“overhuman”).
Analyzing this claim is, at first blush, difficult—Nietzsche scholars disagree on the details
concerning the Übermensch even more than transhumanists disagree on the details concerning
posthumans, and Sorgner’s claim relies on his own idiosyncratic evolutionary understanding of
the Übermensch as a new species that Nietzsche believes may come about through the breeding
of “higher” humans (Sorgner 2009, p. 6). Sorgner argues that Nietzsche believed that evolution
took place in sudden, discrete steps, rather than gradually, so that, “If the conditions within one
species are such that an evolutionary step can take place, various couples at the same time give
birth to members of a new species” (p. 7). In other words, gather together Nietzsche’s higher
humans, and they will produce the children of a new superhuman species. According to Sorgner,
Nietzsche believed that no Übermensch has existed yet, but that in the coming age of science a
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new type of creature with “significantly different potential from that of higher humans” would
emerge (p. 8).
Importantly, Sorgner also explains the appeal of the posthuman to transhumanists—
claiming that “scientifically minded people” who have abandoned their belief in traditional
religious doctrines might find comfort and meaning in transhumanism (2009, p. 9). This claim is
not unique to Sorgner—other transhumanists such as More (1990) have argued similarly, though
often hesitantly. Truly grappling with the theological implications of Darwinian evolution and
the modern scientific worldview is a worrisome task. We can no longer tell the same stories of
original sin and Heaven to give the struggling and suffering of life meaning. Instead, modern
science continuously reminds us of the smallness of human life. The universe is no more for us
than it was for any of the species we find fossilized remnants of in the ground. This smallness
can get intolerable, and in the case of many writers, transhumanism might best be understood as
a new way of conceiving ourselves as more than human, and certainly more than animals—or at
least we can be. Like many (though, importantly, not all) religions, transhumanism effectively
provides the adherent with hope of a new world and deathless life to come if they act correctly
(in transhumanism’s case, rationally and scientifically). The possibility of posthuman life—
something more than human—might serve to give human actions some meaning. Sorgner
believes that Nietzsche intended the Übermensch to function somewhat similarly.
When Nietzsche is interpreted the way Sorgner interprets him, the apparent similarities
with transhumanism are obvious—just substitute “higher humans” with “transhumanists” and
Übermensch with “posthuman,” and the story remains mostly the same. And Sorgner’s
description of Nietzsche fits perfectly with his own endorsement of what he calls “liberal
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eugenics” (2009, p. 5).4 The question, of course, is whether Sorgner is right to interpret
Nietzsche this way. Between you and me, I think there are some reasons to be skeptical.
3

DIE ÜBERMENSCHEN

While Sorgner’s right about some things—Nietzsche, like transhumanists (and for that
matter, like contemporary biologists), does not believe that species are immutable or that human
nature is unchanging—his description of the Übermensch is seriously flawed. Nietzsche himself
directly tells us not to interpret the concept as a new evolutionary species, writing:
The word Übermensch to designate a type that has turned out supremely well, in
antithesis to ‘modern’ men, to ‘good’ men, to Christians and other nihilists…has
almost everywhere been understood with perfect innocence in the sense of those
values whose antithesis makes its appearance in the figure of Zarathustra: that is
to say as an ‘idealistic’ type of higher species of man…Other learned cattle
caused me on its account to be suspected of Darwinism […] (EH, Books: 1). 5
Like several of Nietzsche’s (or, rather, Zarathustra’s) most famous concepts, it’s not clear
whether or not the Übermensch is meant to be merely a literary device (Hauskeller 2010, p. 35).
It’s certainly not clear that Nietzsche thought the Übermensch would be radically biologically
distinct from human beings, or that the Übermensch would have vastly superhuman physical and
cognitive capabilities. One alternate interpretation of all the Übermensch talk is that the
“mensch” part is just as important as the “über” part. In other words, that Zarathustra is
ironically saying that “super” human lives can justify human life—that we don’t need to look for
otherworldly justification. In that case, interpreting the Übermensch as a literally superhuman
creature would be entirely missing the point. And it’s not clear why Sorgner thinks no

“Liberal eugenics” here is contrasted with “state regulated” eugenics: “In the case of state regulated
eugenics, the state decides [what traits are desirable], whereas in the case of liberal eugenics, the parents
have the right to decide what ought to be done to offspring. Transhumanists seem to identify a further
type of eugenics which I suggest could be called autonomous eugenics. People may decide for themselves
whether they wish to be transformed into posthumans by technological means” (Sorgner 2009, p. 7).
5
With the exception of EH, Nietzsche’s works are cited by section rather than page number. For EH,
passages are cited by chapter title and section number.
4
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Übermensch has ever existed, when Nietzsche actually appears to use the very much human
Cesare Borgia as an example of one (EH, Books: 1). Yet despite these cracks in Sorgner’s
analysis, the belief that Nietzsche and transhumanists have much in common persists. 6
Not all transhumanists are so keen on rubbing shoulders with Nietzsche. Bostrom, for
instance, claims that transhumanism, with its enlightenment values and the general utilitarian and
libertarian leanings of its believers, has more in common with John Stuart Mill than Nietzsche
(Bostrom 2005b). If that’s true, we almost certainly can’t consider Nietzsche an early
transhumanist; Nietzsche reserves some of his harshest criticism for Mill and utilitarianism (e.g.,
BGE §225). More (2010) and Sorgner (2010) both respond to Bostrom by pointing out that
transhumanism is a heterogenous movement and that individual transhumanists need not be
utilitarians—though many are. Both authors identify Nietzsche as a virtue theorist, which is in
theory perfectly compatible with transhumanism.7 Nevertheless, some transhumanists—while
apparently sharing Sorgner’s interpretation of Nietzsche—view Nietzsche as a prototranshumanist of a rather nasty, illiberal sort.
By far, however, the harshest critiques of Sorgner’s paper come from critics of
transhumanism. Of particular note, for my purposes, is Michael Hauskeller’s (2010) response.
There, Hauskeller points to many passages in Nietzsche’s works that directly contradict
Sorgner’s interpretation and put Nietzsche at odds with transhumanism generally. In EH, for
example, Nietzsche tells us, “The last thing that I would promise would be to ‘improve’

Others who support Sorgner’s interpretation include transhumanists More (2010) and Blackford (2017),
as well as Nietzsche scholar Paul Loeb (2010). That’s not to mention critics of transhumanism, who also
often make the connection with Nietzsche, such as Habermas (2003).
7
“While Nietzsche viewed morality as essentially perspectival, we can easily enough fit him loosely within
the virtue ethics approach classically represented by Aristotle” (More 2010). While being a virtue theorist
may be compatible with being a transhumanist, it may not be compatible with being Nietzsche; see Jessica
Berry (2015).
6
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mankind” (EH, Preface, 2). Later, in the same book, he writes of “the holy pretext of ‘improving’
mankind as the cunning to suck out life itself and to make it anemic” (EH, Preface, 8). Quotes
like these are the norm, rather than the exception in Nietzsche’s work. Notably, Hauskeller also
notes Nietzsche’s apparent opposition to personal immortality, citing passages in The Antichrist
where Nietzsche takes aim at the Christian belief in the eternal soul. There, Nietzsche is
particularly concerned with the effects of holding such a belief, writing:
When the centre of gravity of life is placed, not in life itself, but in “the
beyond”—in nothingness—then one has taken away its centre of gravity
altogether. The vast lie of personal immortality destroys all reason, all natural
instinct—henceforth, everything in the instincts that is beneficial, that fosters life
and that safeguards the future is a cause of suspicion. So, to live that life no longer
has any meaning: this is now the “meaning” of life.... Why be public-spirited?
Why take any pride in descent and forefathers? Why labour together, trust one
another, or concern one’s self about the common welfare, and try to serve it? [...]
Merely so many “temptations,” so many strayings from the “straight path.”—
“One thing only is necessary.” (A §43)
Hauskeller, however, believes that Nietzsche’s primary reason for opposing personal immortality
is, “Not so much because he thought it was impossible for us to ever become immortal, but
rather because he believed that most of us are far too insignificant and worthless to deserve
immortality” (p. 35)—a point which is supported in A §43.8 And Zarathustra tells us that more
people die too early than they do too late (TSZ §21). According to Hauskeller, Nietzsche
believes that at the right time, we should embrace our death, rather than fear it, “in order to
plunge again into the great ocean of becoming” (p. 35). Hauskeller gestures in the right direction
here, but his points are flawed and require significant expansion. Nietzsche has far more to say
about immortality that’s of philosophical interest.

8

In fact, passages in Daybreak indicate that Nietzsche thinks all, not just the majority, of humans are
undeserving of immortality: “And you earth-dwellers, with your petty conception of a couple thousand little
minutes, want to burden eternal existence with yourselves everlasting!” (D 211)

11
Sorgner (2010) responds to Hauskeller in two ways: first, he argues that Nietzsche’s
criticism of immortality mainly applies to the Christian conception of immortality, which
Sorgner claims Nietzsche dislikes specifically because of its otherworldly nature, and hence its
non-existence (p. 61). Second, Sorgner argues that Nietzsche attempts to replace the Christian
concept of immortality with a this-worldly, or naturalistic, immortality—that of the eternal
recurrence. If that’s true, Nietzsche might not be against personal immortality full-stop, just
certain types of immortality that require otherworldly metaphysics.
4

DEAD THOUGHTS AND ETERNAL THINGS

Sorgner is wrong on both points. If you focus solely on the aphorisms Hauskeller cites,
from A and TSZ, you might assume that Nietzsche is primarily concerned with the way the
Christian promise of immortality diverts the believer’s attention from enjoying and interacting
with the real world to securing a nonexistent, otherworldly future. This point is certainly a part of
Nietzsche’s criticism, but it’s only a small part. Even in the above passage from A, there is more
going on that is worth unpacking.
The belief in eternal life, or eternal things in general, carries with it the belief that
noneternal things are lacking in comparison. Perfect or higher things, so the reasoning goes,
should not lack properties like immortality and immutability. Take any good thing, and it could
always be made greater by making it immortal or permanent. This devaluation of ephemeral
things becomes especially problematic if all things that exist actually are ephemeral. Couple this
with a problem presented by the way in which people conceive of a thing or act’s ultimate value
as a function of that thing’s lasting end or purpose, and we have a recipe for nihilism. In short,
life seems pointless—all things, it seems, are fleeting, and everything will be forgotten. Religions
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seek to deal with these problems in one way or another, either by embracing the fleetingness of
things or by crafting some metaphysical realm of permanent things.
Traditionally, Christian writers have taken the devaluation of the ephemeral to the
extreme. Blaise Pascal, for instance, asks us to seriously consider our lives being followed by
infinite time, in which we either have been annihilated and do not exist, or else in which we exist
in some alternate state (Pascal, XLVI). In both cases, the course of our Earthly lives takes up
only an infinitesimal point on this infinite timeline, and the events of our lives are, consequently,
infinitely trivial unless they have some sort of effect on our coming infinite state. For Pascal,
Earthly existence is characterized by its pointlessness and unpleasantness—the only thing that
has any meaning is securing salvation. All other activities amount to nothing. He writes:
Let us think about it, then say whether it is not beyond doubt that the only good in
this life lies in the hope of another life, that we are only happy the closer we come
to it, and that, just as there will be no more unhappiness for those who were
completely certain of eternity, there is no hope either of happiness for those who
have no glimmer of it! (ibid.)
If we remove the possibility of an otherworldly happy ending from Pascal, we find a view
that is, I think, quite similar to Schopenhauer’s—that is, a view of life as a period of pointless
and unpleasant distractions. For Pascal, happiness is possible in a miraculous other life, but for
Schopenhauer, lasting happiness in just plain impossible and life is a curse. As he writes, “To the
hope of immortality of the soul there is always added that of a ‘better world’; an indication that
the present world is not worth much” (Schopenhauer, p. 467). Schopenhauer even goes so far as
to argue that time is the way in which the pointlessness of existence is revealed to us, writing:
[Time] is the form by whose means the vanity of things appears as their
transitoriness, since by virtue of this all our pleasures and enjoyments come to
naught in our hands…our life is primarily like a payment made to us in copper
coins, for which we must then give a receipt; the coins are the days, and the
receipt is death…. (p. 574)
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But we don’t need to go as far as Pascal or Schopenhauer to find this sort of reasoning at
work. Such a stance may be summed up by an argument like, “If there’s no God or possibility for
an eternal, better life to come, and my existence and humanity’s existence will someday end, all
of our actions will have been for nothing and forgotten. Therefore, life is ultimately
meaningless.” One often finds this sort of reasoning accepted, but it’s interesting to note that the
conclusion doesn’t follow from the premise. Why should life have to go on forever in order for it
to have meaning? Nietzsche, as we’ll see below, tries to reverse this devaluation of transitory
things by arguing that the rare, fleeting, raw experiences of life are the most precious, and that it
is instead eternal things that would be lifeless. Nietzsche’s critique of Christian immortality is
not merely that it’s an otherworldly justification of life, but a critique of the belief that the
individual life requires this sort of eternal justification at all.
At any rate, Nietzsche is clearly thinking of this-worldly immortality when he remarks,
“A single immortal man on earth would be enough to drive everything else on earth to a
universal rage for death and suicide out of satiety with him!” (D 211). And how are we to
understand Zarathustra’s statement that death is the “consummation” of life, and his instructions
that we “die at the right time,” if not as criticism of this-worldly longevity (TSZ §21)? Sorgner is
clearly wrong to suggest Nietzsche is only concerned with the specifically Christian conception
of immortality, even if Christian immortality represents a particularly extreme example.
As for the importance of immortality to transhumanism, the desire to overcome death is,
as More and Vita-More write, “one point on which all transhumanists agree” (2013). 9 The vast
majority of writers identifying as transhumanists consider the radical extension of the human

9

Sorgner tentatively suggests that the desire for immortality may not be a necessary feature of
transhumanism, though he concedes that most transhumanists do desire it (2010, p. 61). Other
commentators, such as Blackford (2017), doubt that transhumanism can be separated from the quest to
defeat death—a view I suspect is correct.
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lifespan one of the essential goals of the movement. Some authors have gone so far as to label it
the primary goal of the movement.10 Given the frequency with which the topic appears in the
literature, it’s hard to argue otherwise. In The Transhumanist Reader, for instance, compiled by
Max More and Natasha Vita-More, 20 out of the 42 collected essays either deal primarily with or
have large sections dedicated to the possibility of escaping death, by far beating out other
favorite topics like eugenics and the singularity.11 Perhaps more importantly, the possibility of a
scientific answer to death is, it seems, the main selling point of transhumanism—the first thing to
mention when going door-to-door with your copy of The Age of Spiritual Machines. Unlike the
obscure, frequently off-putting, and occasionally dull descriptions of posthumanity, immortality
seems concrete and immediately soothing.
Transhumanists hope that the technological means of escaping death are coming in the
near future. Advances in genetics and a better understanding of the aging process, for instance,
may allow us to slow or reverse senescence. Molecular nanotechnology, following the famous
Richard Feynman quote that we might someday “swallow the doctor,” is another commonly
suggested anti-aging tool (Bostrom 2005b). These technologies alone wouldn’t be the end of
death—maintaining health and defeating aging is vastly more complicated and unpredictable
than a pill here and a shot there, and healthier cells won’t do much for car crashes, gunshot
wounds, famine, etc.—but they may expand the upper limits of the human lifespan. More radical
suggestions involve discarding the human body for good, either by replacing one’s fleshy bits
with mechanical bits or by uploading one’s consciousness—perhaps many copies and save
states—into a computer. Such is the future predicted by Ray Kurzweil (1999), who paints an

Damien Broderick, for instance, writes, “The true goal of transhumanism is the defeat of aging and
death” (2005, p. 434).
11
The hypothetical point at which artificial intelligence takes over the development of new technology,
leading to an explosion of rapid technological growth (see Vinge 2013).
10
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eschatological picture of humans merging with machines to become godlike entities. As this sort
of technology is unlikely to be rolled out for any of this year’s consumer electronics trade shows,
transhumanists often hope to prolong or suspend their own lives until the day in which such
technology exists. Here, much hope is placed in the dubious science of cryonics and alternative
diets.12
True immortality, such as the immortality of the soul in Christian theology, is not
necessarily what is on the table here. If you desire to live literally forever, the outlook is not
good. Current cosmological models of the universe give us reason to question whether there will
even be a forever to live in. Even supposing that some cyclical or multiverse model of the
cosmos turns out to be accurate, there’s little reason to believe that the breakdown of our own
neighborhood of the cosmos will be survivable.13 One might object, then, to the use of the term
“immortality” when we are really talking about extreme longevity. Nevertheless, transhumanist
writers themselves frequently use “immortality” and “forever” to describe what they are talking
about.14 Perhaps this is because, emotionally speaking, the difference between living forever and
having the date of one’s death postponed to an unimaginable date is negligible. Or perhaps it is
due to the scientific optimism characteristic of transhumanism—one cannot say for certain what
will or won’t be possible for the scientists of the future, and this opens up the possibility for faith
12

See the discussion of cryonics in Wowk (2013); the paleo diet in Rose (2013); and calorie restriction in
Kurzweil and Grossman (2004).
13
Cf. The Transhumanist FAQ (2003): “The heat death of the universe is thus a matter of some personal
concern to optimistic transhumanists!” (p. 37).
14
E.g., Minsky (2002), “I’m sure that most of us feel that it’s only another 100 years until we have
nanotechnology and downloading and immortality…maybe it’s 200, who cares, with cryonics it might not
matter. The question is, if we’re within a century or two of immortality—now I don’t just want
longevity…” (p. 167); Kurzweil and Grossman’s book titled Fantastic Voyage: Live Long Enough to Live
Forever (2004); the name of The Immortality Institute; Prisco (2013), “Mind uploading, the transfer of a
human mind, memories, personality and ‘self’ (whatever ‘self’ is) to new high-performance substrates is
the ultimate technology for immortality,” (p. 235) and so on and on. In some instances, sure, this
enthusiasm is salesmanship— “Live Long Enough to Live Even Longer” doesn’t have quite the same ring
to it. But very often, the hope for literal immortality appears genuine.

16
that true immortality may, in fact, end up being possible. At any rate, the emotional draw of
transhumanism is the promise of a superhuman state in which fleshy imperfections are a thing of
the past. Chief among these imperfections, and the driving obsession in the transhumanist
literature, is mortality.
What about Sorgner’s claim that Nietzsche puts forward the eternal recurrence as his own
theory of immortality? Despite the attention that’s paid to the eternal return in the scholarship,
Nietzsche only very rarely alludes to it in his published works,15 giving us good reason to be
suspicious of the claims that Nietzsche took himself to be putting forward some important
metaphysical truth. Whether Nietzsche intended the eternal return to be a useful myth (the most
common view among scholars) or had something more literal in mind matters little here. What’s
interesting is how well the idea fits the views I attribute to Nietzsche above.
The idea is simple enough. It is illustrated in the familiar story about probability—an
immortal monkey (or perhaps infinite mortal monkeys), sitting and typing away at a typewriter
for an infinite amount of time, will eventually type out Hamlet in its entirety. Not just Hamlet,
but Blood Meridian, Beyond Good and Evil, Neuromancer—the total library, as Borges says, and
more—our monkey would type out this library of all possible books an infinite number of times.
Or, in other words, any possible event in an infinite sequence will occur an infinite number of
times. Given an infinite universe (or an infinite number of universes), we’d have an infinite
number of people resembling you and me and every other possible thing. These would not be
numerically identical selves, of course, but copies—recurring patterns in an infinite web of stuff.
It will become clearer in the following sections why Nietzsche would find the idea of
eternal recurrence appealing, but a little can be said here. There are many religious traditions that

15

The most direct example is in GS §341, though it also plays a prominent role in TSZ.
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have not relied on the idea of personal immortality to give life meaning but have instead
emphasized that the individual is only a part of an everchanging whole. Though Nietzsche rejects
what he sees as nihilism in some of those traditions, his views don’t appear to be so far removed.
In Human, All Too Human, for example, he writes:
If one considers, then, that a man’s every action… in some way becomes the
occasion for other actions, decisions, and thoughts; that everything which is
happening is inextricably tied to everything which will happen; then one
understands the real immortality, that of movement: what once has moved others
is like an insect in amber, enclosed and immortalized in the general intertwining
of all that exists. (HH § 208)
The idea of eternal recurrence is meant, in part, to emphasize this connectedness of
things. Max More (2010), in his defense of Sorgner, writes that the eternal recurrence is one
Nietzschean idea that is incompatible with transhumanism, “Both for its inherent implausibility
and for its opposition to progress…” (p. 28). And More is right (about the progress part anyway),
but this is an excellent example of why Nietzsche makes a bad transhumanist. The eternal
recurrence is not suitable to serve the Christian or transhumanist desire for an extended or
infinite individual life. One does not fall asleep at death and wake up in the next life. Thoughts,
experiences, narratives, these are the recurring things. As a myth, the eternal recurrence provides
us with a means of evaluating our lives and dealing with the threat of nihilism outlined above—
and it does so without falling prey to Nietzsche’s criticisms of personal immortality.
5

THE UNDESIRABILITY OF IMMORTALITY

Nietzsche’s most direct comments on immortality come in D §211, where he writes, “Let
us be indulgent towards a being of a mere seventy years! —he has not been able to imagine the
‘everlasting boredom’ he himself would experience—he has not had enough time to do so!” (D
§211). The idea here is a familiar one, both in philosophy and fiction—immortality is thought to
be undesirable in part because life would become unbearably boring. Nietzsche also adds his
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own twist, remarking that everyone else would grow sick and bored of the immortal person, as
well (ibid.).16 Such remarks are what lead Hauskeller to conclude that Nietzsche’s primary
objection to immortality is the unworthiness of the recipients. Nietzsche’s point, however, is
more complicated than it might first appear.
We can start with the suggestion that the immortal life would grow boring enough to be
undesirable. The most famous philosophical analysis of this concern is found in Bernard
Williams’s “The Makropulos Case” (1973). Williams’s essay takes its name and topic from the
Karel Čapek play, in which a woman named Elina Makropulos has taken an elixir of everlasting
life. At the time of the play Elina is 342 (she has been 42 for 300 years) and has grown tired of
living. By the play’s conclusion, she stops taking the elixir and dies. Williams writes that Elina’s
trouble was “a boredom connected with the fact that everything that could happen and make
sense to one particular human being of 42 had already happened to her. Or rather, all the sorts
of things that could make sense to one woman of a certain character…” (Williams 1973, p. 90,
emphasis added).17
Williams’s paper is sometimes responded to flippantly, perhaps because of his use of the
word “boredom,” to describe some more extreme state.18 If we assume that her character has
remained constant enough for her to remain recognizably the same person over time, Elina will
have repeated her favorite experiences again and again, each moment in time becoming a smaller
and smaller—and thereby less memorable or impactful—part of the totality of her life. New

“Are you not mindful of all the other things which would then be obliged to endure you to all eternity,
as they have endured you up to now with a more than Christian patience? Or do you think to inspire them
with an everlasting sense of pleasure at your existence?” (D §211)
17
Bostrom (2008) actually accepts something along these lines: “It is clear that in order for an extremely
long life to not become either static or self-repeating, it would be necessary that mental growth continues”
(fn. 24).
18
Cf. Nagel’s (1986) response, “Can it be that he is more easily bored than I?” (p. 224).
16
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experiences and goals then begin to seem altogether familiar, dull, utterly trivial, and ephemeral.
Williams suggests that even the patterns of personal relations, falling in love, forming new
friendships, “must take on the character of being inescapable” (p. 90). Oddly enough, there’s also
something of an inverse of Pascal’s earlier point going on here. Earthy actions may gain meaning
insofar as they lead us to Heaven, but why does any experience in Heaven matter when it’s
followed by infinite time in which that same experience is repeated infinitely? I suppose Heaven
could be a pleasure machine, where the experience of singing hymns is so pleasurable that we
can think of nothing else. Elina’s not in Heaven, of course, quite the opposite. But her
experiences are shrinking in importance.
Much of what Nietzsche has to say on immortality is remarkably similar to Williams.
Nietzsche frequently stresses that the most valuable experiences are the rarest, and he claims that
we lose interest in what we love once it becomes common to us.19 In the final aphorism of BGE,
for example, he complains that the thoughts he has committed to paper have lost their novelty
and look “so immortal, so pathetically decent, so dull!” (BGE §296). When these thoughts first
struck him, they were “colorful… full of thorns and secret spices” (ibid.). Yet even the simple
act of putting these thoughts into words carves them into lifeless stone, so to speak. Williams
imagines living long enough that the cycle of excitement and boredom itself becomes
predictable and boring. People grow close then drift apart, goals are achieved or abandoned,
worlds are fully explored, games grow stale. Repeat, repeat, repeat, until, to quote Elina
Makropolus, “everything is the same…singing and silence” (Williams 1973, p. 82). The things

See GS §14, “We gradually become satiated with the old, the securely possessed, and again stretch out
our hands; even the finest landscape in which we live for three months is no longer certain of our love,
and any kind of more distant coast excites our covetousness: the possession for the most part becomes
smaller through possessing.”
19
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you and I love are not somehow immune. By wishing for more, we do a kind of violence to what
we love.
For this reason, Nietzsche often extolls forgetfulness as a virtue, a capacity necessary for
life and the “digestion” of experience (GM II 1). He remarks that a bad memory can be an
advantage, as “one enjoys the same good things for the first time” (HH §580). A person
incapable of forgetting, he suggests, “would no longer believe in his own being… he would in
the end hardly dare to raise a finger” (UM I, p. 62). I find that understanding Nietzsche’s remarks
on forgetfulness, and the complexities tied to the notion of boredom in both Nietzsche and
Williams, is made easier through a discussion of artistic influence. I’m thinking of Harold
Bloom’s theory of poetic influence, and a problem that Bloom sums up with a line by John Keats
about John Milton: “Life to him would be death to me” (Bloom 1973, p. 32). Bloom argues that
young poets discover themselves—their styles, thoughts, things they wish to say—in the works
of others, and that this is what inspires them to write poetry themselves in the first place. Here
they are faced with a problem: the poets that influence them have already mastered the style and
subject they wish for themselves—they find themselves as having arrived, as Nietzsche
frequently says, “too late” (BGE §269). The realization of this influence causes the young poet
anxiety, and she is faced with the choice between rebelling against her predecessor or accepting
her own redundancy. In order to carve out space for herself— “to rally everything that
remains”—the young poet begins to misread and distort her influences and define herself as a
revision and alternative (Bloom 1973, p. 22).
There is a more general principle that can be drawn here: artists tend to define themselves
in opposition to their influences—as an improvement, revision, something that has not yet been
tried, and so on. Successful artists become old-fashioned in service of the new—artworks and
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movements are forgotten to clear the stage. If they were not, then our cultural memory would be
so inundated as to make the production of any more art redundant—a tiresome exercise of the
past. Personal growth is not too dissimilar; we grow bored and dissatisfied, and this feeling
drives us to change.
Zarathustra tells us that we should die at the right time, using an analogy of apples hanging
from a tree (TSZ §21). Some fall too early, but most too late. The message here sounds harsh, but
Nietzsche has something like aesthetic bad taste in mind—something is around long enough to
grow boring. A more relatable modern example might be that of a television show that carries on
for seasons after its major plot points have all been resolved and the original cast replaced. At
any rate, Williams adopts the too early, too late, framework. He argues that there are good
reasons for dying, like Elina Makropolus, before one becomes so bored with oneself and the
world as to lose the desire to live. At the same time, there is reason for not dying before that
point. Williams writes, “Necessarily, [death] tends to be either too early or too late. EM reminds
us that it can be too late, and many…need no reminding that it can be too early. If that is any sort
of dilemma, it can, as things still are and if one is exceptionally lucky, be resolved, not by doing
anything, but just by dying shortly before the horrors of not doing so become evident” (Williams
1973 p. 100).
Of course, we’ve been considering the case of Elina Makropolus as she might be if her
character remains relatively stable. Williams, for his part, asks whether forgetfulness taken to its
extreme might solve Elina Makropolus’s problem—perhaps her character might change so
completely that she avoids boredom—and this will lead Williams (and us), to a discussion of
identity, and what it means to survive at all.
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6

THE “I” IN IMMORTALITY

So much for the reasons Nietzsche finds immortality undesirable. We can now examine
the ways in which Nietzsche would think the personal immortality desired by transhumanists is
impossible. By this I don’t mean technologically impossible—Nietzsche obviously doesn’t have
anything to say on that subject—but metaphysically impossible, given the assumptions most
transhumanist writers are making.
Nietzsche’s analysis of forgetfulness is prescient—it reminds me of a paper critical of
transhumanist aims: Walter Glannon’s, “Identity, Prudential Concern, and Extended Lives”
(2002). There, Glannon considers the life-extending potential of recent advances in genetics and
argues that “a lifespan significantly longer than the present norm would be undesirable because it
would severely weaken the connections between past- and future-oriented mental states and in
turn the psychological grounds for personal identity and prudential concerns” (p. 1). Glannon
supports this claim with an explanation of how memory is controlled in the brain, which
routinely discards useless memories to avoid clutter—maintaining equilibrium between learning
and forgetting. If Glannon’s account of memory is correct, it seems like the psychological
character important for survival can persist only for a limited time. We cannot keep memories
around forever without overloading the brain’s storage system, thereby impairing learning and
decision making. Glannon concludes that “the connections between mental states like
anticipation and memory that ground personal identity hold only for so long and gradually
weaken and fade…” (p. 280). Nietzsche, of course, does not talk about the brain, but in his own
way—with his frequent use of digestion metaphors to describe the way that memories and
experiences are processed—he believes something similar. Consider his suggestion in HH §41
that, “If a man of eighty thousand years old were conceivable, his character would in fact be
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absolutely variable, so that out of him little by little an abundance of different individuals would
develop.”20
Of course, transhumanists might respond by claiming that some neural upgrades are in
order. Theoretically, we might alter the limitations of human memory, the way the self is
perceived over time, and so on. In fact, they might respond to all of what was covered last
section in this sort of way—we may be adjusted so as not to become like Elina Makropulos—
perhaps adjusted to be incapable of feeling anything wholly negative at all. Many transhumanists
anticipate that extreme modification of the brain will be necessary in order to realize their vision.
David Pearce (2005), for example, advocates for the development of technologies that will
eliminate pain altogether.21 Posthumans in this sort of utopia would be incapable of boredom or
sadness altogether. As Pearce writes, “Against boredom even the gods struggle in vain’, said
Nietzsche; but he failed to anticipate biotechnology” (Ch. 4). Glannon doubts such an easy route
exists, but the transhumanist spirit is one of optimism. At any rate, once we start discussing
radical modifications of the brain and the ways in which we typically find meaning in everyday
experiences, we begin to run into issues of personal identity. Would it really be possible for me
to undergo such a radical transformation and still be me?

20

Ironically, this may be why transhumanists writers seem to feel extreme longevity is as good as, or
interchangeable with, literal immortality. The psychologists Daniel Bartels and Lance Rips (2010), for
instance, have shown that people attach more value to future goods when they feel more closely linked,
psychologically, to the future self that will receive the goods. If the decision maker’s future self is
described in such a way that indicates less psychological connectedness, the decision maker attaches less
value to the reward. Bartels and Rips suggest that this tendency may help explain why people attach less
value to goods when they know a delay will occur before that good can be obtained. The longer the delay,
the less psychologically connected one feels to the person obtaining the good. Switch goods out for some
ill, like death, and the same may apply. Saying “I will die in 5000 years” is, emotionally speaking, almost
as good as saying “I will never die,” because one feels, on some level, that the death that will occur is
some other person’s problem.
21
Of course, Nietzsche has much to say about the quest to eliminate pain and suffering as well. For
instance, in D §174: “Are we not, with this tremendous objective of obliterating all the sharp edges of life,
well on the way to turning mankind into sand? Sand! Small, soft, round unending sand!”
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The metaphysics of personal identity are commonly discussed in transhumanist writings,
particularly in the context of posthuman neural augmentation. Most transhumanists accept a neoLockean view of the self—one in which a person in the future can be said to be you if a certain
psychological pattern is shared between you and this person in the future.22 In this way, survival
amounts to the continued preservation of this psychological pattern. It’s easy to see how things
might get complicated, however, when considering that many of the technological upgrades
discussed in the literature are supposed to be desirable precisely because they modify the
psychology of the person. Questions then arise as to how much modification would be too much,
in the sense that undergoing the procedure would effectively be suicide. On the other hand, the
neo-Lockean view is useful for transhumanists in other ways—one might survive the process of
uploading if the resultant simulated mind preserves one’s psychological pattern.
It’s important to note, however, that Nietzsche does not believe in the existence of any
unified, consistent, psychological self that would satisfy transhumanist desires. Instead,
Nietzsche describes the individual as an oligarchy of warring and shifting drives.23 “I” do not
have thoughts, rather, thoughts come and go (BGE 17). The same goes for memories and
impressions (WP 502). The “I” here is only a grammatical fiction (BGE §17). That’s not to say,
of course, that there’s no room to talk about persons, or that one might not, through selfreference, tell a narrative about oneself, have goals, hopes, and so on. Instead, what’s under
attack here is “I” as a constant, singular thing, whether physical, psychological, or metaphysical.
Susan Schneider, in “Future Minds: Transhumanism, Cognitive Enhancement and the
Nature of Persons” (2009), groups Nietzsche with Derek Parfit, as well Hume and the Buddha, as
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E.g., Bostrom (2004); More (1995); Kurzweil (2005).
See BGE Preface, §16-19. For a collection of the scholarly literature on the topic, see Nietzsche and the
Problem of Subjectivity (2015), eds. João Constâncio, Maria João Mayer Branco, and Bartholomew Ryan.
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holding a “no self” view. The comparison to Parfit is spot on. Parfit (1984) argues that we are not
persistent selves over time, but more like a succession of more or less psychologically connected
selves. For him, survival is a matter of degree—the question of whether “I” have survived is
comparable to asking whether a nation is the same as a nation in the past. In both cases, there’s
not always a clear answer. Parfit claims that after accepting this view, he began to care less about
his own inevitable death. 24 He writes, “Instead of saying ‘I shall be dead,’ I should say, ‘There
will be no future experiences that will be related, in certain ways, to these present experiences”
(Parfit 1984, p. 281). Yet there will still be experiences—these will simply be less closely
related.
Like Parfit Nietzsche describes people as being like nations (BGE §19) and seems
skeptical of all talk of numerical identity.25 It makes sense, then, that Nietzsche occasionally
speaks of death as if it does not exist in any real sense at all. Take, for example, GS §109, “Let us
be on our guard against saying that death is contrary to life. The living being is only a species of
dead being, and a very rare species.” In fact, Nietzsche also has his own version of Parfit’s view
that after his death there will continue to be experiences more or less related to his present
experiences—Nietzsche expresses this same idea with the eternal recurrence.
Transhumanists occasionally reference Parfit in the context of uploading. Parfit’s most
famous thought experiment involves Star Trek-like teleportation machines.26 Step into
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This may also be the case with Hume, whose cheerful rejection of immortality and lack of concern
about death during his final days apparently disturbed his friends (Boswell 1777). Hume, like Nietzsche
and Parfit, compares people to nations: “I cannot compare the soul more properly to any thing than to a
republic or commonwealth…” (Treatise I.VI).
25
“From the period of low organisms, man has inherited the belief that there are identical things (only
experience which has been educated by the highest science contradicts this tenet). From the beginning,
the first belief of all organic beings must be that the whole rest of the world is One and unmoved” (HH
§18).
26
See Reasons and Persons, pt. 3.
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teletransporter E on Earth, and it will break down your body and send information about the
placement of every one of your body’s molecules to teletransporter M on Mars, where a copy of
your body will be made. For Parfit, stepping into teletransporter E is death, insofar as there will
no longer be a body and brain numerically identical with the body and brain that stepped into E.
Yet Parfit also argues that the continued existence of a qualitatively similar copy of you on Mars
is as good as survival under normal circumstances. So, if the process of uploading is thought of
as being similar to Parfit’s teletransporter case, then it seems like Parfit provides an argument for
thinking uploading is as good as survival.
But it’s crucial not to miss the actual point here that this science fiction thought
experiment is used in service of. Imagine a further scenario, in which teletransporter M doesn’t
produce an exact copy, but just a very similar one. How similar does this copy have to be for the
transportation to be as good as survival under normal circumstances? Certainly, there’s a point
where we’d intuitively say there’s been too much change, but it’s difficult to imagine some hard
cutoff point where one person has become another. The end goal of these thought experiments is
expressing that difficulty. Parfit describes coming to his views of the self like this:
My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year,
and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls
of my glass tunnel disappeared. There is still a difference between my life and the
lives of other people. But the difference is less. Other people are closer. I am less
concerned about the rest of my own life, and more concerned about the lives of
others. (Parfit 1984, p. 281)
While Nietzsche would almost certainly never let the sentence, “Other people are closer,”
near any of his writing, one can see a similar idea underlying this Parfit quote as that in HH
§208. The individual is understood as a part of whole, rather than atomized. What Nietzsche and
Parfit have to say about the self follows from the view of a person as physical thing—a brain and
body—going through constant physical changes and constantly interacting with other physical
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things. The transhumanist writing on uploading, however, smacks of transporting a ghost
between machines, such that my subjective view, my thinking thing, survives the process.
Though almost no transhumanist writers will openly cop to dualism, at the very least they tend to
view and describe death as the annihilation of the subjective self—like the movie screen going
permanently dark in the mind’s theater.27 But that’s exactly the “glass tunnel towards darkness”
view Parfit describes above. And if we are thinking of copies, why should it matter so much that
copies of me, qualitatively identical to me for a moment until we diverge, are uploaded to a
computer? And what good does it do, after I’ve died, to have a computer carry on what my brain
was up to? I suspect the answer is actually supposed to be something like, “It feels to me like my
subjective self will continue on existing in the computer, and that the glass tunnel would be
extended,” but even if there’s not these sorts of feelings at work, why is it so important that the
computer simulates a continuation of my brain? It would be a terrible loss, I suppose, if my
elementary school memories were lost to the world.
At any rate, if we take what Nietzsche—and Williams, Glannon, and Parfit—say
seriously, and we dismiss talk of abstract essences and psychological patterns, why should it
matter so much if there is someone who identifies as me, 3000 years from now? If that someone
is me by virtue of having a character sufficiently close to mine, we might suspect this person to
be living a rather repetitive, Makropulos-like life (and they presumably wouldn’t be keeping up
with the times very well). If this future person is very different from me, as would be expected
after so much time and it such a different context (and after posthuman upgrades), in what

E.g., More on death, “It is nothing. It is simply the end of experience” (2013, p. 15). I most associate
this sort of “lights out” view of death with Thomas Nagel (1986), who describes death: “my world will
come to an end, as will yours when you die…one day, this consciousness will black out for good and
subjective time will simply stop” (p. 225). Yet Nagel’s description of death comes at the end of a full
book defending his dual-aspect theory of mind and requires that he reject what Parfit has to say, both
about the self and death.
27
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substantial sense are they me at all, any more than others who are very different from me? Is it
that they can construct a hazy memory or two that resembles my treasured moments—moments
of a narrative they must feel little real connection to? Is that what the fuss is about? Photographs
of people you can’t remember, stored in a dusty attic?
7

A POSTHUMOUS LIFE

What are we besides human brains and bodies, thinking human thoughts, with human
fears and feelings, speaking human languages, telling human jokes, with human relationships
and tastes? I can no more imagine myself being transformed into a posthuman than into a
chimpanzee, and neither can transhumanists.28 In both cases, it seems I lose those things that
define me and give life meaning.
All this, it seems, is a case of “cruel optimism”—in wishing for a life without human
limitations, I end up wishing my own destruction and replacement—I wish to be someone else. 29
Transhumanists talk—rightly so—about the extinction risks posed by future technology, but
visions of posthumanity are visions of a future without humans. And while it seems inevitable
that someday there will be no more humans, transhumanists dream of accelerating us towards
this conclusion. When talking about “enhancement,” “improvement”, and “evolutionary steps,”
they remain committed to the same tired values of the past, treating human life as something to
be fixed or redeemed, not embraced.

From The Transhumanist FAQ: “Posthumans may have experiences and concerns that we cannot
fathom, thoughts that cannot fit into the three-pound lumps of neural tissue that we use for
thinking…Posthumans might shape themselves and their environment in so many new and profound ways
that speculations about the detailed features of posthumans and the posthuman world are likely to fail”
(2003).
29
I’m borrowing a term here from Lauren Berlant (2011), who defines cruel optimism as “a relation of
attachment to compromised conditions of possibility whose realization is discovered either to be
impossible, sheer fantasy, or too possible, and toxic.” As such, the optimistic desire one feels is actively
harmful to one’s goals and flourishing.
28
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Babette Babich (2017), commenting on Sorgner’s original article, writes that
transhumanism is the latest version of Nietzsche’s hated ascetic ideal. She writes that the
transhumanist “wants a videogame style life…without suffering, without illness, without
permanent death…” (p.123). Babich is mainly concerned with Sorgner’s arguments on eugenics,
but her conclusion here is similar to my own. Transhumanists may respond that they aren’t after
absolute perfection, but there’s no doubt that they’re involved in the business of Nietzsche’s
ascetic priests by looking to the promise of another existence to justify our own. And this
existence is otherworldly. The clean and simplified science fiction musings of transhumanism
bear little resemblance to complex, messy reality, where hundreds of interacting genes are linked
to even simple traits and cryonics companies go bankrupt and their bodies—which are in all
likelihood damaged far beyond any possibility of recovering information—thaw out. Much as in
Nietzsche’s criticism of Christian immortality, transhumanism diverts attention from the
concrete to the fantastical—science will solve it. Yet here we are with plastic in our blood,
scrolling through news of anti-vaxxers, fascist political parties, burning jungles, with minimumwage money, dreaming of individual escape into the metaverse.
The truth is that transhumanism is more intimately entwined with Christianity than may
be assumed. In the nineteenth century, the Russian monk Nikolai Fedorovich Fedorov taught that
the Christian resurrection of the dead was a scientifically realized, physical resurrection, and that
we the living have a duty to pursue the means of physical immortality and resurrecting all those
who have died in the past. Fedorov is cited as an influence on transhumanism by More and VitaMore (2013). The philosophy of the Jesuit paleontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, who, in his
posthumously published book The Phenomenon of Man (1955), describes evolution as a
teleological process in which higher levels of consciousness develop and eventually unify into a
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universal consciousness, bears a conspicuous resemblance to Kurzweil’s visions. The
introduction to The Phenomenon of Man was written by the biologist Julian Huxley, who himself
coined the term transhumanism in his book New Bottles for New Wine (1957), writing, “The
human species can, if it wishes, transcend itself…. We need a name for this new belief. Perhaps
transhumanism will serve: man renaming man, but transcending himself, by realizing new
possibilities of and for his human nature.”30 More recently, the physicist Frank Tipler has
continued in Fedorov and Teilhard’s footsteps, speculating about a future intelligence of the
future harnessing the power of the collapsing universe to resurrect all life to live in a heavenly
simulated world (Tipler 1994). Tipler identifies this intelligence as “God”— (flipping through
the pages of the Bible, you might be skeptical). Other transhumanists, such as Giulio Prisco,
advocate a transhumanist religion. According to Prisco, in the coming decades we will develop
the technology to upload human minds, and “we will be free to roam the universe and grow
beyond limits as ‘software angels’” (p. 235). Perhaps, he speculates, we already live in a
simulation in which miracles (performed by those who run the simulation) may be possible.
Perhaps we can reach these simulation masters by calling out to them. Thus, “It seems that the
supernatural, which we have kicked out the back door of superstition, may come back through
the main doors of science” (p. 237). Prisco refers to his church as “The Turing Church” (!), but it
is quite clearly Christianity in a new skin. Heaven is promised in Silicon Valley clouds; this
fleshy prison must be renounced. When Sorgner suggests that transhumanism serves a religious
function, he states the obvious.
Yet the project of researching transhumanism reveals a strange irony. Many crucial
online manifestos are now difficult to find, their websites defunct, the web design decades out of

30

According to Huxley, Teilhard quoted Nietzsche approvingly (The Phenomenon of Man, Introduction,
p. 13)—one more reason to view Teilhard as a proto-transhumanist, I suppose.
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fashion. Many of the books on the subject in the university library have yellow pages, and cover
art that might now be described as “retro”. We’re forced to manufacture more new bottles for old
wine. Whatever the technology of the future will look like, it will be, like all things human,
messy, flawed, prone to error, far from ideal—and all the fuller of life for it. It will grow old, too.
Yet The Transhumanist FAQ states:
It is so easy to forget how good things can be when they are at their best. But on
those occasions when we do remember – whether it comes from the total
fulfillment of being immersed in creative work or from the tender ecstasy of
reciprocated love – then we realize just how valuable every single minute of
existence can be, when it is this good. And you might have thought to yourself, ‘It
ought to be like this always. Why can’t this last forever?’ Well, maybe – just
maybe – it could. (p. 34)
But it can’t; life is change, movement, conflict—life is “that which must always overcome itself”
(TSZ §34). More and Sorgner interpret this Nietzsche quote as an imperative to take up some
Promethean project of human improvement, but life overcomes itself when cattle eat grass, when
the immune system fights off a virus, and when one memory vanishes to make room for another.
Experiences are here for a moment, then gone. How we choose to spend our time and what gives
us pleasure makes us who we are, and someone with infinite time and maximum pleasures will
be no one in particular— “absolutely variable.” Instead of dreading death we might instead
recognize it as just another instance of life overcoming itself—the end of our narrative, then, but
not the end. And our ephemeral existence need not be meaningless but can be all the more
meaningful bookended by infinity—secret words written in the sand before the tide moves in.
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